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 Imagery Rescripting (IR) is a relatively novel therapeutic intervention for social anxiety 
(SA) in which patients recall and engage with autobiographical memories of socially distressing 
events. During the intervention phase of IR, patients are asked to rescript the events of the 
memory to develop a more satisfying outcome for their “younger self” within that memory. This 
intervention strategy has been shown to reduce distress when recalling the memory and to yield 
reductions in SA symptoms at post-intervention and follow-up. However, some patients report 
significantly fewer positive outcomes than others. It is possible that the effectiveness of 
outcomes in IR may, at least in part, depend on the methods patients choose to guide their 
“younger selves” toward more satisfying outcomes within their imagined memory during the 
intervention phase of IR. With an eye toward gathering foundational data for future studies of IR 
in clinical samples, the primary goal of the present study was to examine the relative effects of 
visualizing using avoidant, self-compassionate, or assertive intervention strategies in response to 
imagined socially distressing situations outside the context of IR. The study measured how each 
strategy influenced emotional distress and perceived degree of mattering to others, and examined 
whether the relationship between the type of intervention strategy used and outcomes may be 
moderated by trait levels of SA. Undergraduate participants (N = 258; 67% female) were 
assigned to one of three conditions in which they were asked to imagine using one of three 
strategies (avoidance, self-compassion, or assertiveness) in response to five vignettes describing 
socially distressing events. Results of regression analyses demonstrated that higher levels of SA 
and having been assigned to the avoidance condition (compared to self-compassion or 
assertiveness) were both associated with higher levels of emotional distress and negative self-
beliefs. When analyses were re-run comparing participants at the upper and lower ends of the SA 
spectrum, low socially anxious (LSA) participants (n = 48) did not differ in outcomes across 
assigned coping strategies; in contrast, among high socially anxious (HSA) participants (n = 41), 
the use of self-compassionate strategies significantly lowered negative affect compared to the use 
of avoidance and assertiveness. Implications for IR protocols are discussed within the context of 
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Literature Review 
Experiences shape individuals’ beliefs about what to expect from the self, others and the 
world around them. Some autobiographical memories are easily forgotten while others seem to 
remain more accessible, carry greater weight in their personal meaning, and maintain a stronger 
emotional impact. Over decades, researchers have explored how variables associated with the 
original event can lead to differences in autobiographical memory encoding and recall; for 
instance, the type of affect activated during the event, its intensity, and the nature of beliefs 
directly tied to the memory have been written about extensively in the research literature on 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (Chukwuorji, Ifeagwazi, & Eze, 2017; Falsetti, Resick, 
& Davis, 2003; Hathaway, Boals, & Banks, 2010). In recent years, it is becoming clearer that 
some of the memory processes we attribute to PTSD etiology might have relevance and 
application for other anxiety disorders, including Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD).  
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) 
The cognitive substrate of SAD has been characterized as a desire to make a favourable 
impression on others, with considerable doubt about one’s ability to do so (Clark & Wells, 
1995). Individuals with SAD tend to possess negative self-appraisals regarding their intelligence, 
appearance, social competence and visible signs of anxiety, and fear that these traits will be 
revealed during social encounters (Moscovitch, 2009). Researchers have found that these beliefs 
can take the form of mental self-representations or images (Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 
2000; Ng, Abbott, & Hunt, 2014), which are maintained through a feedback process of 
monitoring threat cues and overestimating social expectations. Clark and Wells (1995) suggest 
those with SAD engage in detailed self-monitoring and emotional reasoning during social 
encounters, which brings awareness to their anxiety symptoms and leads them to believe their 
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internal feelings of anxiety must represent the way they appear to others. For instance, people 
with SAD might experience their heart racing and their face feeling hot and assume their internal 
state is an accurate reflection of what is being projected to the world. Then, an unfavourable 
prediction regarding their appearance or behaviour is conjured, often in the form of a mental self-
image. It has also been suggested that those with SAD disproportionately attend to threatening 
external cues, such as frowns, signs of boredom or confusion from an audience. These cues 
further inform their prediction of how they appear to others, and their mental self-representation 
is ultimately measured up against a perceived audience standard (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). 
Because socially anxious (SA) individuals tend to exaggerate audience standards, their 
unfavourable mental self-representations are unlikely to meet perceived expectations, which 
creates further threat-induced anxiety and a continued cycle of self and audience-monitoring 
(Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Socially Traumatic Memories 
The mechanisms which serve to maintain SA symptoms begin with a pre-existing belief 
that social situations hold some degree of threat potential, possibly arising from dispositional 
traits and past experiences (Clark & Wells, 1995). Consequently, researchers have aimed to 
investigate whether particular moments may have served as pivotal or self-defining experiences 
in socially anxious individuals’ lives that fuel their tendency to perceive threat in social 
situations. In other words, researchers have endeavored to determine whether highly socially 
anxious (HSA) individuals tend to report “socially traumatic” events that operate in the context 
of SAD in similar ways compared to how trauma memories operate within PTSD. To this end, 
Stemberger, Turner, Beidel, and Calhoun (1995) reported that over half (56%) of a sample of 
individuals with SAD recalled a distressing social situation that marked the onset of their SA 
 3 
symptoms. Additionally, Hackmann, Clark, and McManus (2000) discovered that SA individuals 
tend to experience recurrent negative mental imagery in stressful social situations, and that these 
images can often be drawn back to a distressing social experience that occurred around the onset 
of their symptoms. Studies have also shown that HSA people tend to describe these SA-cued 
memories and images as being more vivid, detailed, and imbued with greater negative affect 
compared to the negative images and memories described by low socially anxious (LSA) 
individuals (Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovitch, 2011; Moscovitch et al., 
2018). As well, Erwin, Heimberg, Marx, and Franklin (2006) compared non-anxious controls to 
individuals with SAD in their responses to socially distressing personal experiences and 
discovered that those with SAD reported more PTSD-like symptoms (re-experiencing, avoidance 
and hyperarousal). Although research has consistently shown that SA individual’s socially 
distressing memories differ from non-anxious controls in their emotional and perceptual 
properties (see Morgan et al. 2010 for review), there are mixed findings with respect to 
differences in socially distressing memory retrieval bias, with several studies showing that 
cueing SAD and non-anxious control participants with SA-provoking words and exercises does 
not reliably elicit group differences in socially distressing memory retrieval (Rapee, McCallum, 
Melville, Ravenscroft, & Rodney, 1994; Wenzel, Haugen, & Schmutzer, 2003). However, as 
noted in Morgan et al. (2010), SAD memory studies have used wide-ranging methodologies to 
elicit socially distressing memories. For instance, Stopa and Jenkins (2007) found that after 
asking HSA participants to hold a negative self-image in mind during an anxiety-inducing 
speech task, they more quickly produced a negative memory than when asked to hold a positive 
self-image in mind. Although this study did not compare HSA and LSA individuals, it is possible 
that differences in rate or emotional valence of memories retrieved would more reliably emerge 
 4 
under certain SA-priming conditions. These methodological issues need to be resolved before 
drawing any firm conclusions about SAD and memory retrieval bias.  
Negative Self-Imagery 
Apart from exploring the potential etiological role of socially traumatic memories in 
SAD, researchers have also investigated the enduring and maintaining features of memory-
derived negative self-representations, which commonly present in the form of negative self-
imagery (Hackmann et al., 2000). According to a recent review of the imagery literature in SA 
(Ng, Abbott, & Hunt, 2014), evidence from several studies supports the notion that bringing 
negative imagery to mind during social situations increases anxiety and objectively impairs 
performance in social situations. One of the central conclusions of this review was that these 
undesirable outcomes can be elicited in LSA individuals as well; when encouraged to develop 
and hold a negative self-image in mind, LSA individuals display heightened anxiety and 
performance impairments similar to HSAs (Ng et al., 2014). These findings suggest it is perhaps 
not the mere experience of negative images that lies at the root of the problem for HSAs, but that 
they more frequently and spontaneously recall these images, appraise them as being more 
meaningful and accurate, and manage them ineffectively compared to LSAs (see Moscovitch et 
al., 2011; Moscovitch et al., 2018). For example, HSAs report being more likely to suppress or 
passively accept the images rather than spontaneously alter their features like their LSA 
counterparts (Moscovitch et al., 2013).  
Social Pain 
As previously mentioned, HSAs tend to experience more negative affect when recalling 
memories and images drawn from past socially distressing experiences (Moscovitch et al., 2011; 
Moscovitch et al., 2018). Negative affect encompasses a broad set of emotions, including anger, 
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anxiety and shame. Social pain, however, is a more precise form of negative emotion that tends 
to follow the types of experiences socially anxious people report in these memories (e.g. social 
exclusion, rejection, or humiliation). The social pain literature outlines a number of ways this 
affective experience could play an important role in SA etiology and maintenance.  
Dispositional Pain Sensitivity 
Social pain shares well-established neurological overlap with physical pain. As reviewed 
below, studies have shown that individuals who display greater sensitivity to physical pain are 
also more sensitive to social pain, and this sensitivity may be genetically influenced. A number 
of experimental paradigms have illustrated that the same neural activation patterns displayed in 
response to physical pain are activated in situations that elicit social pain, such as receiving 
negative feedback on personal qualities and experiencing social rejection during online games 
(Eisenberger et al., 2011; Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Furthermore, the 
relationship between physical and social pain sensitivity appears to be reciprocal, as 
manipulating physical pain experiences can cause parallel changes in social pain sensitivity, and 
inducing social pain has been shown to heighten physical pain sensitivity (Eisenberger et al., 
2010; Master et al., 2009).  
Additionally, physical and social pain appear to be more easily or intensely activated in 
some individuals. In one study, participants who reported higher physical pain following a 
painful heat stimulation were also more likely to report higher social pain following a social 
exclusion (Eisenberger, Jarcho, Lieberman, & Naliboff, 2006). This relationship remained after 
controlling for trait neuroticism and trait anxiety, which implies the result was not accounted for 
by a general negative reporting style (Eisenberger et al., 2006). In fact, there is evidence to 
suggest this sensitivity may be genetically predisposed, at least in part, as research has shown 
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that individuals who possess a particular opioid receptor gene reported higher levels of pain 
sensitivity (Chou et al., 2006) and those who possessed this gene were also more likely to report 
heightened rejection sensitivity in self-report and neural measures (Way et al., 2009). 
Enduring Impact of Social Pain 
Studies have shown that socially painful events maintain an experiential impact that 
distinguishes them from memories of physically painful events. People are readily able to recall 
and re-experience profound instances of emotional pain felt at the time of social betrayals that 
occurred decades prior (Hansson, Jones, & Fletcher, 1990). People also demonstrate a unique 
ability to re-experience the pain of feeling socially injured, whereas the emotions and sensations 
of physical pain are typically recalled but not re-experienced in memories relating to physical 
pain (Chen, Williams, Fitness, & Newton, 2008). Social pain can also maintain a lasting impact 
by increasing reported SA in subsequent social interactions. Fung and Alden (2016) discovered 
that social pain mediated the relationship between a standardized social exclusion and 
participants’ ratings of SA in anticipation of a subsequent social interaction. Furthermore, in a 
follow up study, these researchers successfully ameliorated social pain by prophylactically 
administering acetaminophen, which reduced anticipatory SA for the next social interaction 
(Fung & Alden, 2016).  
Formation of Attitudes and Beliefs Following Socially Distressing Events 
Research has shown that HSAs tend to rely on excessively negative interpretations and 
derive negative self-beliefs from socially distressing events. Indeed, individuals with SAD are 
more likely to consider socially painful autobiographical memories to be central to their self-
identity (O’Toole et al., 2016). These findings suggest that the memory of exclusion, rejection, 
or humiliation can become an important source of information for HSA individuals, which they 
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use to navigate expectations of themselves and others around them. To this end, Merrifield, Balk, 
and Moscovitch (2013) discovered that negative self-appraisals mediated the relationship 
between recalled childhood teasing and SA symptoms, accounting for 51% of the effect, in a 
clinical sample of participants with anxiety disorders. These findings were correlational in 
nature, but some cautious speculations can be drawn from this study, including the possibility 
that individuals who arrived at self-depreciating conclusions in response to childhood teasing 
(e.g. that they are unattractive, unintelligent, or socially incompetent) may also be more likely to 
report higher levels of SA symptoms.  
Socially anxious individuals are also more likely to develop expectations about their 
social value from socially distressing events. Flett et al (2016) revealed that the degree to which 
participants believed they mattered to others mediated the relationship between childhood 
maltreatment and SA, suggesting that HSA individuals were more inclined to interpret childhood 
maltreatment as evidence that they are not important and valued by others. Perceived sense of 
mattering captures social value across three domains, including the degree to which respondents 
believe others: (a) are aware of them (e.g. “In a social gathering, no one would recognize me”), 
(b) deem them to be important (e.g. “People would sometimes inconvenience themselves to help 
me”), and (c) rely on them (e.g. “People would tend to rely on me for support”). This construct 
exemplifies the types of core beliefs that lie at the foundation of SAD. Although some 
researchers propose that the fundamental core of SAD is comprised of negative self-appraisals 
with an accompanied fear of revealing one’s perceived flaws to evaluative others (Moscovitch, 
2009), other researchers note that HSA individuals tend to place themselves within a social rank 
hierarchy in which they view others as being significantly less flawed and more superior (Aderka 
et al., 2009; Weisman et al., 2011). From this perspective, problematic core beliefs in SA may be 
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best described as interpersonal in nature (e.g. “everyone is better than me” as opposed to “I am a 
bad person”). Indeed, sense of mattering has been shown to account for variance in constructs 
closely related to SA over and above the effects of self-esteem, highlighting the significance of 
the interpersonal hierarchy in SA pathology (Cha, 2016).  
Imagery Rescripting 
Given that socially distressing autobiographical memories likely play an important role in 
the formation and maintenance of SA symptoms, therapeutic interventions that directly address 
and work within “socially traumatic” memories could yield meaningful clinical benefits when 
treating SAD. Imagery Rescripting (IR) is a type of intervention that researchers and clinicians 
have used to guide modification of HSA individuals’ memory-derived negative core beliefs. In 
this technique, the patient is asked to bring a meaningful, SA-related autobiographical memory 
to mind. The probes for eliciting such a memory can vary. Often, patients are asked to consider 
thoughts or emotions that they currently experience while entering or anticipating situations that 
evoke SA (Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015; Wild & Clark, 2011). IR proceeds in three phases. In 
the first phase, patients are asked to recall and re-experience that memory from a first-person 
present-tense perspective in as much detail as possible. In phase two, they are instructed to recall 
the same memory, but as an onlooker from their current adult perspective, at which time they are 
asked to mentally travel back in time to help their “younger self” alter the course of events 
within that memory in whatever ways they wish to make the outcomes more satisfying for the 
younger self. Finally, in the third phase, like in phase one, they are instructed to recall the 
memory again from their younger self’s perspective, but this time they are asked to use their 
imagination to incorporate the new information from phase two into their recollection of the 
event. The intervention ends with a discussion about what was learned during the process. 
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Compared to non-active (e.g., waitlist) control groups, IR has been shown to yield strong 
reductions in distress while recalling the negative autobiographical memory and very large 
reductions in SA symptoms – outcomes that are on par with cognitive restructuring when 
compared directly within a single session design (Frets et al., 2014; Nilsson, Lundh, & Viborg, 
2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015).  
Mechanisms of Change in IR 
There are a number of possible mechanisms through which IR might work to modify SA 
symptoms. High socially anxious individuals tend to describe SA-cued memories as readily 
accessible and personally meaningful (Hackmann et al., 2000; O’Toole et al., 2016). If changes 
in core beliefs during IR contribute to SA symptom reduction, then discussing personal 
memories might provide more direct access to those core beliefs and increase opportunities to 
address and challenge them. Indeed, Çili and Stopa (2015) discovered evidence to suggest that 
when individuals retrieve highly emotional, self-relevant memories, this process activates their 
current working models of self, which could make those working models more accessible and 
amenable to discussion (see also Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Moreover, Reimer and 
Moscovitch (2015) found that IR led to significant changes in core beliefs about the self and 
others, and that reductions in the strength of negative core beliefs about the self were uniquely 
related to changes in symptoms of SA. Additionally, during IR, patients are asked to re-live and 
fully engage with the emotions and upsetting details of the past event by acknowledging, 
verbalizing and re-experiencing those features (Wild & Clark, 2011). For HSA individuals, this 
process may help to facilitate improvements in their emotion regulation strategies. HSA 
individuals frequently engage in experiential avoidance (EA)—the tendency to ignore or distract 
oneself from unpleasant internal experiences—which has been linked to more negative 
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interpretations during (Sarfan, Cody, & Clerkin, 2018) and following (Levin, Haeger, & Smith, 
2017) socially distressing events. Accordingly, limiting the degree to which HSAs avoid 
unpleasant aspects of socially distressing memories might attenuate negative interpretations of 
these autobiographical events. 
IR also requires that the patient vary their narrative perspective while recalling their 
memory, which may facilitate some degree of cognitive flexibility and increase the likelihood of 
developing novel insights about the situation. For instance, during the initial first-person 
narrative stage, individuals frequently state that their SA-related memories hold negative 
meaning about themselves. However, they will often later express compassion and understanding 
toward the younger self when describing events from the sidelines from the perspective of their 
current, older self.  
Patients undergoing IR are also exposed to salient opportunities to develop novel insight 
when asked to alter the course of events within the memory in a way that makes the experience 
more satisfying for their younger selves. One of the goals of this activity is to provide an 
opportunity to learn more about what the younger self needed and how that might have been 
achieved. Although it is commonly noted by IR researchers that the patient will achieve optimal 
outcomes if they are able to experience “self-empowerment” during this phase of the 
intervention (Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Watson, Rapee, & Todorov, 2016), self-empowerment 
can take many forms. Arntz and Weertman (1999) suggest the patient can experience self-
empowerment by exercising power of choice by deciding on their preferred method of 
intervention, while Watson, Rapee and Todorov (2016) hypothesized that particular methods of 
intervention are more likely to result in a heightened sense of empowerment than others. For 
example, patients might achieve a sense of empowerment by asserting their needs in the face of 
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conflict, such as by having the patient’s younger self stand up to a bully/perpetrator or by 
enlisting help in doing so from their older self. Finally, some researchers have proposed that the 
intervention phase of IR, whereby patients are instructed to alter the course of events in their 
memory, will lead to clinical improvements to the extent that it reduces the accessibility of the 
original memory and its negative features (Wheatley, Hackmann & Brewin, 2009). This goal is 
informed by the “retrieval competition hypothesis,” as outlined in a seminal theoretical paper by 
Brewin (2006) in which he suggests that negative and positive memories compete with each 
other for cued activation and highlights that the power of effective therapy lies in helping 
patients to create new positive or neutral memories that can successfully compete with negative 
memories. Thus, some researchers have proposed that altering the imagery content of negative 
memories could make the negative content in those memories less accessible, perhaps by 
creating new, detailed, positive imagery content that is liable to win the retrieval competition 
(Wheatley, Hackmann & Brewin, 2009). Further research would be required to support the 
veracity of these claims.  
Variability in Procedures and Outcomes 
 Despite favourable overall outcomes, clinical research on IR has shown that some 
participants do not respond to the intervention immediately or do not maintain positive outcomes 
at follow-up (Frets et al., 2014; Moscovitch et al., 2011). Certainly, non-responders are not 
uncommon in the SAD treatment literature (Davidson et al. 2004; Otto et al. 2000; Rapee et al. 
2009). When treatment protocols are delivered in a standardized format, patient factors (e.g. 
comorbid depression, treatment expectancy; Chambless, Tran, & Glass, 1997) can be reasonably 
expected to influence outcomes. Beyond these patient factors, there may also be components of 
the IR protocol itself that contribute to variability in patient outcomes. Much of the IR protocol 
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remains constant across patients, with key components such as repeating exposure to the 
negative internal experiences associated with the memory, varying perspective-taking, and 
altering the content of the memory to make it more satisfying for the younger self. However, a 
critical component that may contribute to changes in SA symptoms is significantly less 
standardized. That is, the manner in which patients choose to intervene within the memory in 
order to make the situation more satisfying for their younger selves is ultimately left up to their 
discretion and can vary considerably. As described below, this could account for some of the 
observed variability in treatment response. 
Common Themes During the IR “Intervention” Phase 
 Clinical experience and research have shown that patients most frequently choose to 
incorporate avoidant, self-compassionate, and/or assertive strategies in order to alter the course 
of events for their imagined younger self within their socially distressing memories (Norton & 
Abbott, 2016; Wild & Clark, 2011). An example of avoidance may reveal itself as a patient’s 
expressed desire to have their older self protect their younger self from ever becoming exposed 
to the source of conflict in the first place, perhaps by taking their younger self by the hand and 
leading him/her away from threat to a new location. Socially anxious individuals frequently 
avoid sources of perceived social threat in their day-to-day lives, which can provide temporary 
relief but can also shape their beliefs by reinforcing their perceived inability to cope with 
challenging social situations (Moscovitch et al., 2013). For this reason, therapists may often wish 
to guide patients toward alternate possibilities, such as self-compassionate or assertive 
intervention strategies. However, the therapist may be more likely to provide support rather than 
strong guidance during this phase of IR, as it is generally assumed that patients will receive 
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greater therapeutic benefit if they are supported in taking ownership over their choice of 
intervention strategy (Arntz & Weertman, 1999). 
As previously stated, compassionate and assertive strategies are often preferred or 
encouraged during the intervention phase of IR. Self-compassion has been described as using 
thoughts or behaviours that are informed by: self-kindness—patience and kindness toward 
oneself in light of failures or mistakes; common humanity—the understanding that failures or 
mistakes are not isolating but rather part of a unifying human experience; and mindfulness—
having an awareness of negative thoughts and emotions without accepting them as fixed truths 
(Neff, 2003). Socially anxious people tend to report lower levels of trait self-compassion 
(Werner et al., 2012). Yet, when primed to be more self-compassionate, HSA individuals appear 
to benefit; in one recent study (Blackie & Kocovski, 2017), HSAs were instructed to mentally 
engage in self-compassion following an anxiety-provoking task which led to less post-event 
processing and a greater willingness to participate in future social situations. Harwood and 
Kocovski (2017) also demonstrated that compared to a control writing condition, a self-
compassion writing exercise significantly lowered HSA undergraduates’ anxiety in anticipation 
of an upcoming speech task.  
Another intervention strategy commonly observed during IR is assertive behaviour. 
Assertiveness describes the act of confronting a person or situation in a manner that fulfils one’s 
needs without infringing upon the rights of others (Swee, Kaplan, & Heimberg, 2018). Similar to 
the relationship between SA and trait self-compassion, HSA individuals tend to report lower 
levels of assertiveness. Assertiveness training is a longstanding therapeutic intervention used in 
SA clinical research and practice. Integral to this therapeutic approach is the understanding that 
the function of assertive behaviour is not to alleviate negative emotions such as anxiety, but to 
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promote responses that are discordant with dysfunctional cognitions that maintain avoidant (non-
assertive) behaviour (Swee et al., 2018). In their IR intervention study on bullying memories, 
Watson, Rapee, and Todorov (2016) compared the effects of using revenge, forgiveness, or 
avoidance and discovered that revenge was experienced as less stressful than forgiveness but led 
to fewer positive evaluations of coping and no significant decrease in negative affect (whereas a 
reduction did occur in the forgiveness condition). It is unclear whether these findings on the 
effects of imagined revenge would resemble the effects of imagined assertiveness during IR. 
Both revenge and assertiveness might encourage the patient to feel empowered, but through 
distinct avenues: whereas assertiveness involves fulfilling one’s needs without infringing upon 
the rights of others, revenge involves acts of aggression directed intentionally toward another 
person. 
Current Study: Objectives and Hypotheses 
The current study aimed to compare the relative effects of using avoidant, self-
compassionate and assertive coping strategies on reported negative affect, social pain and 
perceived sense of mattering during imagined socially distressing situations, and to examine 
whether the relative effects of these strategies would depend on participants’ levels of trait SA. I 
hypothesized, first, that higher trait SA would predict higher levels of negative affect and social 
pain and lower mattering across conditions. Second, we predicted that, collapsed across levels of 
SA, the use of assertive and self-compassionate strategies would be associated with lower NA 
and social pain and greater mattering relative to the use of avoidance. Finally, we advanced no 
strong moderation hypotheses about whether the relative impact of the three types of coping 
strategies would depend on trait SA levels. Specifically, we reasoned that although self-
compassionate and assertiveness strategies might have more meaningful impact for those with 
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higher levels of trait SA, they might also be more difficult for higher SA individuals to imagine 
implementing effectively because being assertive and self-compassionate may feel inherently 
foreign and threatening to people who tend to be more conflict-avoidant and self-critical. 
Findings are expected to  shed light on the effects of using different strategies to cope with 
imagined social stress, with potential applicability for clinicians guiding socially anxious clients 




The sample consisted of undergraduate participants recruited from the University of 
Waterloo research participation pool who signed up for the current study advertised as 
“Navigating Tricky Social Situations”. From the original collected sample (N = 294), 37 
participants were removed prior to analyses due to: (a) completing the study either in less than 15 
minutes (n = 12) or more than 12 hours (n = 11) to ensure participants had likely completed the 
study within the same day but also spent a reasonable amount of time on the procedures and 
questionnaires within; (b) at the end of the study, reporting low scores on how honestly they 
answered the study questions (reported lowest value on 3-point likert scale; n = 9 excluded); or 
(c) at the end of the study, reporting a low overall score on their level of engagement during the 
study (reported value of 7 or below on 15-point likert scale; n = 5). These exclusions resulted in 
a final sample of 258 participants. Participants were, on average, 19.91 years old (SD = 1.88), 
with 67.1% identifying as female. Participants identified their cultural/ethnic background as 
follows: 39.5% Caucasian, 26.4% East Asian, 19% South/South-East Asian, 5% Middle Eastern, 
2.7% Black, 2.7% Hispanic, and 4.7% “other” or declined to answer.  
General Procedures 
 Participants were sent a link via email to complete the study procedures and 
questionnaires, which took place exclusively online. The study took approximately 45 minutes to 
complete and participants were remunerated 1.0 research participation credits for their 





 Five vignettes were created for the purpose of this study (see Appendix A). All vignettes 
described situations in which the main character was socially excluded, rejected, or humiliated. 
The main characters in each vignette were described as experiencing scenarios in which they 
would reasonably experience doubts about the social impression they were making on others. 
Although traditional IR protocol involves working with clients’ negative autobiographical 
memories, vignettes describing painful social experiences were used in the current study to 
provide greater standardization and control, allowing comparisons between different intervention 
strategies under the same contextual circumstances. 
Coping Strategy Characteristics 
The same five vignettes were paired with each of the three coping strategies describing 
the main character either using avoidance, self-compassion, or assertiveness to cope with the 
distressing situations. As shown in Appendix A, avoidance strategies involved the main character 
distancing themselves from the source of distress, self-compassion strategies involved the main 
character engaging in thoughts of self-kindness, common humanity and/or mindfulness1, and 
assertiveness strategies involved the main character attempting to meet his/her needs by actively 
confronting the source of distress without infringing upon rights of others. In this study, all forms 
of assertiveness involved directly facing or addressing sources of discomfort, but not all 
situations involved confronting other individuals. In scenarios that did involve interpersonal 
confrontation, the assertive response involved standing up for the main character’s feelings 
without using physical force or denigrating speech toward others.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Within the self-compassion condition, each paired coping strategy included at least one facet of self-compassion, 
with all three facets represented across the five vignettes. Vignettes 1, 2, 3, and 4 involved self-kindness, vignettes 3 
and 5 involved common humanity, and vignette 5 involved mindfulness. 
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Pilot data were collected from 12 participants on the vignettes and paired coping 
strategies to determine whether there was sufficient distinction and agreement about whether 
each coping strategy could be reasonably considered “avoidant”, “self-compassionate,” or 
“assertive”. Participants blinded to condition were asked to categorize each coping response one 
at a time within one of these three categories, each of which was first described and defined for 
participants in broad terms.  For two of the five vignettes, participants demonstrated 100% 
agreement with researchers’ intended categorizations. For the other three vignettes, 11/12, 10/12 
and 6/12 participants demonstrated 100% agreement. The vignette and paired coping responses 
that were correctly classified by only 6/12 participants were edited to ensure that the distinctions 
between assertive and self-compassionate strategies were clearer, as difficulty with this 
distinction represented the most frequent source of disagreement.  
Condition Assignment  
Participants were asked to imagine themselves experiencing the events and the coping 
strategy described in each scenario. All vignettes and coping responses were described from a 
second-person perspective (e.g. “now imagine that you…”). All participants involved in the 
study were asked to imagine themselves in each of the same five vignettes, but random 
assignment to the avoidance, self-compassion, or assertiveness conditions determined which type 
of coping response the participant was asked to imagine using in response to each vignette 
scenario. Once a participant was assigned to a condition, they were asked to imagine themselves 
using the same type of described coping strategy for each of the five vignettes. For example, a 
person assigned to the self-compassion condition would imagine using self-compassionate 
coping strategies for all five vignette scenarios. After each vignette, participants responded to 
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self-report measures in which they rated negative affect, social pain, and perceived mattering in 
relation to experiencing the imagined intervention strategy.  
State Self-Report Measures 
Mattering scale. The Mattering scale is a 24-item questionnaire that illustrates good 
construct and discriminant validity (Elliott et al., 2004). It reflects an individual’s perception of 
how much they matter to others by capturing the degree to which respondents believe others 
would be aware of them (e.g. “In a social gathering, no one would recognize me”), deem them 
to be important (e.g. “People would sometimes inconvenience themselves to help me”), and rely 
on them (e.g. “People would tend to rely on me for support”) after envisioning themselves as the 
main character in the vignette/paired intervention strategy.  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). Participants were also asked to rate 
their level of distress by completing the negative affect subscale of the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). The subscale consisted of 10 emotion adjectives, 
including items such as “ashamed”, “distressed” and “nervous.” Across multiple studies, each of 
the subscales have demonstrated good reliability (e.g., α = .89 for positive affect, α = .85 for 
negative affect in Crawford and Henry, 2004). 
Social pain scale. Additionally, participants were asked to rate their social pain. 
Researchers have yet to develop a well-validated measure of social pain so we developed a short, 
4-item scale for the current study based on items similar to that used in prior research (Fung et 
al., 2016). Items included: “My feelings would be hurt,” “I would feel emotional pain,” “I would 
experience a sense of suffering,” and “I would feel emotionally injured.” Similar scales have 
shown excellent reliability (α = .93 in Fung et al., 2016). 
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 Measures following vignettes and the vignettes themselves were presented in 
counterbalanced order. For all measures across all vignettes, participants rated agreement with 
items in Likert-style format, ranging from 1-Strongly Disagree to 5 (or 7)-Strongly Agree. All 
measures across vignettes demonstrated good internal consistency (all alphas > .82). 
Trait Self-Report Measures 
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN). The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 
2000) is a questionnaire that consists of 17 items that measure the presence of social anxiety 
symptoms over the past week. It was administered to participants following completion of the 
vignette protocols. The SPIN is a reliable and well-validated measure (Antony, Coons, McCabe, 
Ashbaugh, & Swinson, 2006; Connor et al., 2000) that demonstrated strong internal consistency 
in the current study (α = .94). 
Data Analytic Plan and Data Preparation 
Data analysis plan. Condition was dummy-coded and hierarchical regression analyses 
were performed with condition and centered SPIN scores entered on step 1, and their interaction 
on step 2 as predictor variables. Composite scores for mattering, negative affect, and social pain 
across vignettes were calculated (see below) and entered as outcome variables in separate 
analyses.  
Missing data, outliers and distributions. The majority of measures in the study had 
zero missing data, with a maximum of 1.6% missing data per item. Little’s MCAR tests were 
non-significant for the measures included in the study, suggesting the data were missing 
completely at random (Little, 1988). Missing data were imputed using the expectation-
maximization approach. Missing data were not imputed when a participant failed to complete the 
majority of items in any particular scale, in which case their data were deleted listwise from 
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analyses involving those measures. Data were scanned for outliers using boxplots and descriptive 
analyses (> 3 SDs above or below the mean). One outlier for the social pain variable and one for 
the negative affect variable were identified and deemed plausible by ensuring there were no 
calculation errors and that the value corresponded with values from a related variable (i.e., if a 
participant reported a low score on negative affect, it would be expected that they would also 
report a low score on social pain). Each measure was normally distributed, with minimal 
skewness and kurtosis (less than 2 and greater than -2 for each measure; Field, 2009; Gravetter & 
Wallnau, 2014). 
Composite scores derived from outcome measures. For each measure, total scores 
were summed across vignettes to reflect an overall sense of mattering, negative affect, and social 
pain. Thus, each total score was a composite of five scores, collected after each of the five 
vignettes. These composite scores demonstrated adequate internal consistency, with negative 
affect yielding an alpha of .86, social pain demonstrating an alpha of .74, and mattering yielding 
an alpha of .80. 
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Results 
Equivalence of Condition Groups 
  Descriptive statistics for participants across conditions are presented in Table 1. There 
were no significant differences between condition groups in participant age, F(2, 86) = .065, p = 
.937, gender distribution X2(2) = 3.38, p = .184, ethnicity X2(18) = 13.88, p = .737, or SPIN 
scores, F(2, 253) = 2.154, p = .118.  
Table 1.  
Values for Study Variables Across Conditions 
Note. Outcome variables represent composite scores across all five vignettes. 
 
Correlations between Outcome Variables 
 Significant correlations were observed between all three outcome variables. Negative 
affect was negatively associated with mattering, r = -.227, p < .001, and positively associated 
with social pain, r = .568, p < .001, while mattering shared a negative relationship with social 
pain, r = -.292, p < .001.  
 Avoidance Self-Compassion Assertiveness 
Age 19.75 (1.75) 19.87 (2.22) 20.15 (1.60) 
Gender (% Female) 63.0 66.3 75.0 
Ethnicity (% Caucasian) 40.2 42.4 36.1 
SPIN [M (SD)] 27.07 (15.58) 22.73 (13.45) 26.26 (15.97) 
Negative Affect [M (SD)] 128.04 (32.67) 107.65 (29.40) 117.85 (32.14) 
Social Pain [M (SD)] 91.45 (18.08) 81.28 (19.65) 84.71 (21.20) 
Mattering [M (SD)] 254.09 (46.15) 283.73 (43.74) 290.04 (42.20) 
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Hierarchical Regression Analyses  
 Two hierarchical regression analyses were run for each outcome measure (negative 
affect, social pain and mattering) with SPIN scores on the first step, condition on the second, and 
their interaction term on the third. Condition was dummy coded and each regression analysis 
maintained one coping condition as the point of comparison against the two other conditions in 
the analysis. Thus, for each of the three outcome variables, one hierarchical regression was run 
with avoidance set as the comparison point against assertiveness and self-compassion, and 
another with assertiveness set as the comparison point against self-compassion and avoidance.  
When negative affect was the outcome variable, there was a significant main effect of 
SA, R2 = .185, F(1, 254) = 57.735, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, with higher SA predicting more negative 
affect overall. There was also a main effect of condition, R2 = .232, F(2, 252) = 7.688, p = .001, 
ηp2 = .06. Compared to use of avoidance, use of assertiveness resulted in lower negative affect 
(126.48-9.48), β = -.132, t(252) = -2.108, p = .036, as did use of self-compassion (126.48-16.60), 
β = -.246, t(252) = -3.908, p < .001. Assertive and self-compassionate strategies produced non-
significant differences in negative affect (116.97-7.16), β = -.106, t(252) = -1.588, p = .114.  
Similarly, when social pain was the outcome variable, there was a significant effect of 
SA, R2 = .182, F(1, 254) = 56.659, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, as well as condition, R2 = .213, F(2, 252) 
= 4.821, p = .009, ηp2 = .04. Higher SA predicted higher social pain. Less social pain was 
experienced when using either the assertive intervention strategies (90.47-6.30), β = -.142, t(252) 
= -2.244, p = .026, or self-compassionate strategies (90.47-7.80), β = -.188, t(252) = -2.946, p = 
.004, compared with the avoidance strategies. Assertive and self-compassionate strategies 
elicited a degree of social pain that did not significantly differ from each other, (84.18-1.52), β = 
-.037, t(252) = -.540, p = .590. 
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Finally, with perceived mattering as the outcome variable, there was a significant effect 
of SA, R2 = .042, F(1, 254) = 11.199, p = .001, ηp2 = .04, with higher SA predicting greater 
perceived mattering. There was also a main effect of condition, R2 = .147, F(2, 252) = 15.498, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .11. Compared to avoidance, assertiveness promoted a greater sense of mattering 
(255.11-35.49), β = .342, t(252) = 5.190, p < .001, as did self-compassion (255.11-27.16), β = 
.279, t(252) = 4.207, p < .001. Sense of mattering did not differ between the assertiveness and 
self-compassion conditions, (290.56-8.36), β = -.086, t(252) = -1.218, p = .225. 
There were no significant condition x SA interactions across the three outcome measures 
(all p’s > .099). 
Follow-up Analysis: High vs. Low Socially Anxious Groups 
Results demonstrated that higher levels of trait SA predicted higher negative affect and 
social pain and lower mattering, and that assertive and self-compassionate strategies were more 
effective than avoidance strategies for promoting a lower degree of social pain and negative 
affect and higher sense of mattering for all participants, unmoderated by trait SA. Trait SA in 
these analyses was operationalized as a continuous variable, with SPIN scores ranging widely 
across our entire sample of participants. Next, we wished to explore whether this same pattern of 
results would replicate in an analogue subsample of high SA participants selected from the 
higher end of our sample distribution whose SA symptoms resembled those of individuals with 
SAD. We aimed to compare this group to a low SA subsample from the lower end of the 
distribution whose SA symptoms resembled healthy individuals without problematic anxiety.  
To this end, the current study sample was divided into high and low SA groups 1SD 
above and below the sample mean. The mean SPIN score of the total sample (N = 257) was 25.0 
(SD = 15.0), resulting in an HSA group with cutoff scores above 40 and an LSA group with 
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cutoff scores below 10.2 This process yielded 41 high socially anxious (HSA) and 48 low 
socially anxious (LSA) participants. No significant differences were observed between HSA and 
LSA groups in participant age, t(87) = .396, p = .693, or ethnicity, X2(9) = 4.55, p = .872. There 
was a difference between HSA and LSA groups in their gender distribution X2(1) = 4.57, p = 
.033, with a great number of participants who identified as female in the HSA group3.  
 Next, a multivariate ANOVA was conducted with condition and SA group entered as 
predictors of negative affect, social pain and sense of mattering. Replicating the results of our 
regression analyses, there was a significant effect of Group on negative affect, F(1, 83) = 38.178, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .32, social pain, F(1, 83) = 44.557, p < .001, ηp2 = .35, and mattering, F(1, 83) = 
6.541, p = .012 ηp2 = .07. Similarly, significant effects of condition were observed for negative 
affect, F(2, 83) = 9.411, p < .001, ηp2 = .19, and mattering, F(2, 83) = 4.224, p = .018, ηp2 = .09; 
however, social pain only neared significance, F(2, 83) = 2.818, p = .065, ηp2 = .06. Following 
up the main effect of condition, t-tests were conducted comparing the effects of each pair of 
conditions on negative affect and mattering, collapsed across SA group. Diverging somewhat 
from results of the regression analyses, results for negative affect revealed significant differences 
in negative affect between all pairs of conditions (all p’s < .05), with those who imagined using a 
self-compassionate strategy reporting lower negative affect (M = 98.93, SD = 24.45) than both 
those who imagined using assertiveness (M = 116.93, SD = 38.86) and those who imagined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Connor et al. (2000) determined that SPIN scores above 19 represent clinically significant levels of SA. Other 
researchers have more currently used cutoffs based on their clinical experience and sample distributions. However, 
many researchers have adopted more conservative SPIN cutoff scores of 12 or below for LSA groups and 30 and 
above for HSA groups (Moscovitch et al., 2011; Moscovitch et al., 2012; Moser et al., 2008).	  
3Bivariate correlations demonstrated that gender did not relate to negative affect or mattering; however gender was 
significantly associated with social pain in the full regression sample and in the HSA and LSA group sample. Thus, 
Gender was added as a control variable in the first of step in the hierarchical regression analyses that examined the 
social pain outcome variable. Gender was also added as a covariate in the ANOVA analysis with social pain as an 
outcome variable. There were no meaningful differences in the results compared to those that did not account for 
gender. 
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engaging in avoidance (M = 138.37, SD = 36.78). Results for mattering replicated those of our 
regression analyses, showing significant differences between the avoidance and self-compassion 
(M = 285.42, SD = 42.08) conditions (p = .003), but not between the assertiveness and self-
compassion conditions (p = .544). 
In these extreme group analyses (unlike our regression analyses in which trait SA was 
conceptualized as a continuous variable across the entire sample), a significant interaction effect 
between condition and SA was observed for negative affect, F(2, 83) = 3.388, p = .038, ηp2 = .08. 
As in the regression analyses, no interaction effects were observed for social pain or mattering 
(both p’s > .141). The significant condition x SA interaction effect for negative affect was further 
probed, first, by running two univariate ANOVAs to compare the effects of condition on 
negative affect for each level of SA separately. These analyses revealed a significant effect of 
condition for the HSA group, F(2, 38) = 8.988, p = .001, ηp2 = .32, but not the LSA group F(2, 
45) = 2.001, p = .147, ηp2 = .08. Least Significant Difference post-hoc tests showed that HSA 
participants who imagined using a self-compassionate strategy reported less negative affect (M = 
109.22, SD = 29.73) than HSA participants who were asked to imagine using either assertiveness 
(M = 142.87, SD = 33.56, p = .008) or avoidance (M = 159.29, SD = 22.87, p < .001). HSA 
participants in the assertiveness and avoidance conditions reported degrees of negative affect that 
did not significantly differ from each other (p = .114). Second, we also probed the condition x 
SA interaction for negative affect by conducting follow-up independent t-tests comparing the 
two groups in each condition separately. These analyses revealed that HSAs reported heightened 
negative affect compared to LSAs when they imagined using assertiveness, t(25.163) = 4.891, p 
< .001, or avoidance, t(27) = 4.672, p < .001, but levels of negative affect that were equivalent to 
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Figure 1. Negative affect across coping strategy conditions within high and low SA groups. 


























 People with higher levels of trait SA are more likely to believe they are personally 
flawed and do not matter to others (Flett et al., 2016; Merrifield et al., 2013). These beliefs are 
represented in HSA individuals’ intrusive images and associated autobiographical memories of 
socially distressing experiences (Ng et al., 2014). IR is an intervention that has been shown to 
facilitate significant symptom change in patients with SAD while promoting the efficient 
modification of negative core beliefs encapsulated within socially distressing memories (Reimer 
& Moscovitch, 2015). The IR protocol guides patients to relive their memories from multiple 
perspectives and actively use their imagination to alter the course of events within these 
memories in a way that is more satisfying for their younger selves. However, the ways that 
patients choose to intervene and imaginally alter the course of events during the intervention is 
left up to each patient. Both research and clinical observation suggest that certain ways of 
intervening during IR may be more effective than others, but no clinical guidelines currently 
exist to assist practitioners on the methods they should encourage their socially anxious patients 
to use during the crucial phase of the IR protocol in order to achieve optimal intervention 
outcomes. To this end, the current study aimed to measure the comparative effects of imagining 
using different types of coping strategies commonly involved in this critical phase of IR. 
Specifically, we compared the effects of using avoidance, self-compassion, and assertiveness to 
cope with imagined socially distressing vignettes and examined whether the effectiveness of 
these conditions depended on participants’ levels of trait SA. 
As hypothesized, higher SA was associated with reports of higher negative affect and 
social pain as well as lower mattering. Moreover, irrespective of SA levels, participants who 
imagined themselves using either self-compassion or assertiveness reported decreased distress 
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and higher sense of mattering compared to participants who imagined using avoidance. That 
avoidance yielded the least desirable outcomes is consistent with a broad set of literature that has 
shown harmful consequences—such as distress—tend to follow use of various types of 
avoidance strategies (Moitra, Herbert, & Forman, 2008; Panayiotou, Karekla, & Panayiotou, 
2014). We advanced no definitive hypotheses about interaction effects and our regression 
analyses yielded no significant condition x SA interactions.  
When the study sample was divided into extreme high and low SA groups, results were 
equivalent to those of the regression analysis, with two notable exceptions. First, self-
compassion was more effective than assertiveness in promoting lower negative affect. Second, 
there was a Condition x Group interaction effect for negative affect, such that the superior effect 
of using self-compassionate strategies relative to the other conditions for promoting lower 
degrees of negative affect was observed within the HSA group only, whereas LSAs reported 
levels of negative affect that did not significantly differ across the three conditions. Moreover, 
HSAs who imagined using assertiveness or avoidance reported levels of negative affect that were 
significantly higher than that of LSAs assigned to either of those conditions, but HSAs assigned 
to use self-compassion reported levels of negative affect that were indistinguishable from those 
reported by LSAs in that same condition.   
Impact of Conditions on Negative Affect 
Consistent with expectations, HSAs in the avoidance condition reported higher negative 
affect than those in the self-compassion condition. Surprisingly, HSAs appeared to benefit more 
from self-compassion than assertiveness as an imagined adaptive coping response to socially 
distressing events. What might account for this difference? Both self-compassion and 
assertiveness involve self-advocacy in an effort to attain more self-satisfying outcomes during 
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challenging social situations. However, because socially anxious individuals believe they possess 
low social status and fall below others on the social hierarchy (Aderka et al., 2009; Weisman et 
al., 2011) and because asserting one’s needs (in particular, during interpersonal confrontations as 
described in select vignettes used in this study) can sometimes mean compromising someone 
else’s desires, HSA individuals may imagine that engaging in assertive behaviour means placing 
their needs above higher-ranking others, which could feel undeserving and potentially lead to 
conflict, with negative consequences for their social relationships and their already-tenuous 
social standing. In contrast, self-compassion involves intentionally cultivating an adaptive 
mindset encompassing private self-attitudes that are much less likely to infringe on others and 
lead to imagined conflict. Although practicing self-compassion can be quite challenging for 
people with higher levels of self-criticism (Robinson et al., 2016), HSA individuals in the current 
study appeared to report greater benefits from applying this coping strategy in comparison to 
assertiveness and avoidance, at least for reducing negative affect.  
Although assertive behaviour is not intended to assuage negative emotions such as 
anxiety, it is viewed within the literature as an opportunity to reduce avoidance and challenge 
dysfunctional beliefs about one’s ability to assert one’s needs and the perceived consequences of 
doing so (Swee et al., 2018). Here, we investigated the effects of imagined assertiveness, which 
did not allow participants to gather real-life feedback from having put assertive behaviours into 
action. However, there is some evidence to suggest even multi-session, therapist guided training 
protocols that incorporate assertive behavioural experiments can have limited effects on SA 
symptoms (Marshall, Keltner, & Marshall, 1981), potentially indicating that assertiveness does 
not effectively produce changes in the core beliefs that maintain SA.  
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Self-compassion may have also been a particularly effective for HSAs because one 
component of self-compassion emphasizes “common humanity”—the notion that all humans 
share similar experiences, both good and bad (Neff, 2003). It is possible that emphasizing 
similarities between human experiences might help to de-escalate HSAs’ fixation on their 
perceived low social status and the negative beliefs that inform their low position on the social 
hierarchy. Reflecting on rejection, embarrassment, and humiliation as shared experiences might 
also reduce HSAs’ characteristic tendency to attribute excessive personal meaning to the 
negative event (Moscovitch et al., 2011; O’Toole et al., 2016). It is also possible that self-
compassion resulted in the lowest degree of negative affect for HSAs, on par with that of LSAs, 
because this coping strategy facilitates an adaptive internal dialogue that helps to promote 
effective emotional processing by mitigating experiential avoidance (i.e., avoidance of internal 
experiences, such as thoughts and emotions) (Sarfan et al., 2018).  
Impact of Conditions on Mattering 
Although self-compassion led to reported reductions in negative affect for HSA 
individuals, it did not facilitate an elevated sense of mattering compared to using assertive or 
avoidance strategies, suggesting that either a) none of the conditions in this study had a strong 
influence on mattering, or b) changes occurred but were not captured by the mattering measure. 
Similar to the current study, participants in Watson et al.'s  (2016) study on IR for bullying 
memories experienced reductions in negative affect but displayed no improvements in positive 
self-beliefs when they were instructed to rescript a memory of personal victimization by using 
forgiveness, avoidance, or revenge. Like in Watson et al. (2016), participants in the present study 
self-administered the study protocol without any interaction with a researcher or therapist. It is 
possible that changes in positive self-beliefs, such as mattering, require a higher-intensity 
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protocol in which participants are actively supported by a knowledgeable guide such as a well-
trained clinician or experimenter.   
Social Pain  
Though negative affect and social pain were both significantly associated with condition 
and trait SA in the regression analyses, it is worth noting that in the extreme groups analyses, 
there was a significant condition by SA interaction effect only for negative affect, with use of 
self-compassion facilitating lower negative affect in HSAs relative to the other conditions. It was 
surprising that similar effects were not observed for social pain, given that we expected both 
constructs to encapsulate a similar type of emotional distress in the face of imagined negative 
social experiences. Aside from measurement error, one possible explanation for this discrepancy 
may be that HSAs experienced a broader range of negative emotions in response to the imagined 
scenarios than only social pain and, in turn, that self-compassion exerts its salutary effects on a 
broader range of negative feelings than social pain alone (Arimitsu & Hofmann, 2017; Fresnics 
& Borders, 2017).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Findings should be considered within the context of the study’s limitations. The 
participant sample consisted of university undergraduates, thus restricting the degree to which 
findings can be generalized to community samples with broader age ranges and life experiences. 
As well, a large portion of the study sample (i.e., any participant with SPIN scores that were less 
than +1 SD and more than - 1 SD from the sample mean) was omitted from the group-
comparison analyses; this may have resulted in underpowered comparisons within conditions at 
each level of SA.  
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Additionally, the procedures did not reflect those that would be typically used during an 
IR session, where participants can choose any combination of intervention strategies to guide 
their response to social distress on behalf of their younger self. Here, each coping strategy was 
distinctly and somewhat artificially divided from the others into separate conditions. It is 
possible, for example, that a combination of self-compassionate and assertive strategies would 
produce superior outcomes than self-compassion or assertiveness alone. Other features that 
deviated from typical IR protocols included the lack of therapist guidance and the fact that 
participants were asked to imagine contrived scenarios instead of their own autobiographical 
accounts of socially distressing situations. Without personal autobiographical accounts, 
participants were also unable to engage in the component of IR that urges them to alternate 
between perspectives of their current and past self within the memory. Although this study’s use 
of artificial vignettes restricted the degree to which findings could be applied to our 
understanding of IR processes, the vignettes provided the necessary standardization and control 
required to compare intervention strategies. Future studies can build on these findings by varying 
instructions so that participants are randomly assigned to use any one particular intervention 
strategy within the full IR protocol. 
 Another potential drawback from using vignettes instead of autobiographical accounts of 
socially distressing memories was that artificial vignettes might have evoked less emotional 
distress than personally relevant memories. Indeed, in the current study, HSA participants 
reported only moderate levels of imagined negative affect (M = 28.46, SD = 6.78; maximum 
total score = 50) and social pain (M = 19.89, SD = 3.11; maximum total score = 28) in response 
to the hypothetical vignettes. 
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 Furthermore, we did not collect baseline scores for the outcome measures; as a result, we 
do not know whether there were significant changes in negative affect from before to after 
random assignment to condition, and whether the self-compassion condition may have promoted 
greater changes in negative affect from baseline than the other two conditions. Since participants 
were randomly assigned to conditions, we assume that scores on outcome measures were likely 
equivalent at baseline. However, repeated measurement of changes in outcomes relative to 
baseline would have enhanced our study design and increased our confidence that the observed 
reductions in negative affect among HSAs within the self-compassion condition was a result of 
the beneficial effects of self-compassion relative to the other conditions.  
 Finally, collected outcome measures were based on self-report. Future studies may 
consider using physiological measures to validate participants’ emotional responses, similar to 
the approach used in Watson, Rapee, and Todorov (2016). 
 Future studies may benefit from giving further consideration to the parameters of what 
might constitute a self-compassionate response. The vignette responses devised for the present 
study included facets of self-compassion and were distinct from assertive responses in that they 
were imagined internal thought processes, whereas assertive responses were imagined outward 
behaviours. However, some of the self-compassionate responses may have also involved 
assertiveness toward an “inner self-critic” (Kelly, Zuroff, & Shapira, 2009). Future work could 
also compare the effects of internally directed vs. externally directed assertiveness.  
Within the context of these limitations, the findings from the current study hold potential, 
yet tentative, implications for IR. For all participants, irrespective of trait SA levels, imagined 
avoidance strategies appear to be significantly less effective than either self-compassion or 
assertiveness for reducing negative affect and social pain and promoting a sense of mattering in 
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the face of social threat. Moreover, for those at the upper end of the SA spectrum, self-
compassion appears to be associated with superior outcomes relative to both avoidance and 
assertiveness. Future research is now needed to investigate the effects of different experimentally 
manipulated IR intervention strategies within the context of an actual IR protocol with therapist 
guidance. If the present findings were replicated within that context, it would suggest the need to 
publish updated clinical guidelines for IR that emphasize the importance of guiding patients 
more explicitly toward the use of self-compassionate intervention strategies and away from 
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Appendix A 
Vignette 1: Your friend invited you to a party on Saturday night. It isn’t clear to you what type 
of party this will be, but you assume it will be a casual event because it is being hosted at your 
friend’s home. When you arrive, everyone is dressed in formal attire. In contrast, you are 
wearing blue jeans and a T-shirt. You feel as though people are staring at you when you walk 
into the living room. 
Avoidant intervention: Now imagine that you leave the party immediately and go home 
before more people notice. 
Self-Compassionate intervention: Now imagine that you take a moment to remind 
yourself that this was an understandable error and your clothes do not define who you are 
as a person. 
Assertive intervention: Now imagine that during conversations you have with others at 
the party, go out of your way to point out your casual attire while laughing at your 
mistake. 
 
Vignette 2: Over the past month, you have been spending time with a new group of people you 
met through school. Plans are usually made to get together after class, so everyone leaves 
together. Recently, you saw pictures on social media suggesting that several of your classmates 
spent time together over the past weekend but you were not invited. 
Avoidant intervention: Now imagine that you decide to avoid spending time with your 
classmates after class because you are no longer sure of how they feel toward you. 
Self-Compassionate intervention: Now imagine that you mentally tell yourself that 
there could have been many logical reasons you weren’t invited, and it does not mean 
they don’t enjoy your company. 
Assertive intervention: Now imagine that you start a conversation with your classmates 
about what they did over the weekend so you can casually mention that it sounded like 




Vignette 3: You are working with a group of peers on a school project and you make a 
suggestion. One of the members expresses that they do not think this is a good idea, and the 
other members agree. The member who did not like your idea makes a joke that the group would 
be better off getting suggestions from their younger siblings and the other group members laugh. 
Avoidant intervention: Now imagine that you make an excuse to leave the meeting 
early and go home. 
Self-Compassionate intervention: Now imagine that you mentally tell yourself that 
even the brightest minds don’t share perfect ideas all of the time and you still deserve to 
be heard 
Assertive intervention: Now imagine that after the meeting, you tell the person who 
made the joke that you didn’t appreciate them putting you down and that their attitude 
will discourage open sharing of ideas. 
 
Vignette 4: It is mid-morning and you just arrived at work. You walk past a group of co-workers 
and one of them asks if you wore your funny hat today and the whole group begins laughing. For 
the past few weeks, several of your coworkers have been persistently making fun of you for 
wearing a new hat that you purchased. You normally stick to wearing basic clothes, but liked this 
hat and wanted to try something new. 
Avoidant intervention: Now imagine that you limit the possibility of further unpleasant 
interactions for the rest of the day by avoiding the break room at lunch and keeping a low 
profile at work. 
Self-Compassionate intervention: Now imagine that you ignore the comments and tell 
yourself that your coworkers treating you this way is cruel and what they are saying is not 
a reflection of you, but rather of them and their own insecurities.  
Assertive intervention: Now imagine that you tell your co-workers that the joke is 




Vignette 5: You are about to give a presentation in class. As you make your way to the front of 
the room, you notice that you are tense and your palms feel cold and sweaty. As you begin to 
speak, you also feel your face becoming hot. These physical experiences are so intense that you 
think the entire class must notice all of these things happening to you as well. You think you see 
some of the people in the audience beginning to look uncomfortable. 
Avoidant intervention: Now imagine that you complete the presentation while 
effectively hiding your physical symptoms by positioning yourself behind the podium 
and turning away from the audience as much as possible. 
Self-Compassionate intervention: Now imagine that you face the audience and 
complete the presentation, then afterwards tell yourself that your physical symptoms 
probably weren’t as noticeable as you thought and even if they were, many people feel 
nervous during presentations so the audience could probably understand and empathize. 
Assertive intervention: Now imagine that you notice your symptoms but also realize 
they do not control your behaviour and decide to further expose yourself by walking 
around the stage and facing the audience members for the remainder of your presentation. 
 
 
